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The blind quantum computing protocols (BQC) enable a classical client with limited quantum
technology to delegate a computation to the quantum server(s) in such a way that the privacy of
the computation is preserved. Here we present a new scheme for BQC that uses the concept of
the measurement based quantum computing with the novel resource state of Affleck-Kennedy-Lieb-
Tasaki (AKLT) chains leading to more robust computation. AKLT states are physically motivated
resource as they are gapped ground states of a physically natural Hamiltonian in condensed matter
physics. Our BQC protocol can enjoy the advantages of AKLT resource states, such as the cooling
preparation of the resource state, the energy-gap protection of the quantum computation, and the
simple and efficient preparation of the resource state in linear optics with biphotons.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
In a future, at the time when a scalable quantum computer is realized, there will be much demand for the blind
quantum computation [1–4], since the quantum computer must be super-expensive and super-fragile, and therefore
only limited number of servers can possess it. In particular, it is likely that a client (Alice) who has only a classical
computer or a primitive quantum instrument which is not sufficient for the universal quantum computation will ask
a quantum server (Bob) to perform her quantum computation on his fully-fledged quantum computer. Bob runs his
quantum computer according to Alice’s input and instructions, and finally returns the final output of the quantum
computation to Alice. The crucial point in the blind quantum computation is that Alice does not want Bob to learn
her input, the algorithm she wants to run, and the final output of the computation. For example, if Alice wants to
factor a large integer by using Shor’s factoring algorithm [5], the blind quantum computation must be performed in
such a way that Bob cannot know her input (the large integer), the output of the computation (a prime factor), and
even the fact that he is factoring.
For the classical computation, Feigenbaum [6] introduced the notion of “computing with encrypted data”, and
showed that for some functions f , an instance x can be efficiently encrypted into z = Ek(x) in such a way that Alice
can recover f(x) efficiently from k and f(z) computed by Bob. Moreover Abadi, Feigenbaum and Killian showed
that no NP-hard function [7] can be computed blindly if unconditional security is required, unless the polynomial
hierarchy collapses at the third level [8]. Even restricting the security condition to be only computational [39], the
question of the possibility of blind computing, also known as fully homomorphic encryption, remined open for 30
years [9].
Unlike classical computing, quantum mechanics could overcome the limitation of computational security. An
example of the blind quantum computation was first proposed by Childs [1] where the quantum circuit model is
adopted, and the register state is encrypted with quantum one-time pad scheme [10] so that Bob who performs
quantum gates learns nothing about information in the quantum register. In this method, however, Alice needs to
have a quantum memory and the ability to apply local Pauli operators at each step. Similarly the protocol proposed
by Arrighi and Salvail [2] requires multi-qubit preparations and measurements while Aharonov, Ben-Or and Eban’s
protocol [4] requires a constant-sized quantum computer with memory.
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2On the other hand, in Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi’s protocol [3], adapted to the one-way quantum com-
putation [11, 12] all Alice needs is a classical computer and a very weak quantum instrument, which emits random
single-qubit states. In particular, she does not require any quantum memory and the protocol is unconditionally
secure. In their scheme, Alice’s quantum instrument emits states 1√
2
(|0〉+ eiξ|1〉), where
ξ ∈ A =
{kπ
4
∣∣∣k = 0, ..., 7}
is a random number which is secret to Bob, and each state is directly sent to Bob. Bob keeps all these states
in his quantum memory, and creates the spacial resource state, which is alike to the two-dimensional cluster state
and called “the brickwork state” [3], by applying the controlled-Z (CZ) operation among appropriate qubits in the
received states. Alice calculates, by using her classical computer, the direction in which a qubit should be measured,
and instructs the direction to Bob after some modifications such that (i) the byproduct operators emerged from the
previous Bob’s measurements are compensated, (ii) the random ξ is canceled, and (iii) the true direction and the
true measurement outcomes, which reveal Alice’s input, algorithm and output, remain secret to Bob. Bob does the
measurement on the brickwork state according to the instruction from Alice, and sends the measurement result to
Alice for the next measurement. After repeating such two-way classical communications between Alice and Bob, their
measurement-based quantum computation is finally finished, and Bob returns the final result (classical or quantum)
of the computation to Alice. As is shown in [3], Bob learns nothing about Alice’s input, the algorithm she wants to
run, and the final output of the computation.
In the recent active interaction between condensed matter physics and quantum information science, plenty of novel
resource states for the measurement-based quantum computation beyond the cluster state have been proposed [13–24].
These new resource states have several interesting features and advantages over the cluster state. For example, some of
those resource states are gapped ground states of their parent Hamiltonians, and therefore they can be easily prepared
by cooling condensed matter systems and the measurement-based quantum computation can be protected from noise
by the energy gap [14–23]. In particular, Affleck-Kennedy-Lieb-Tasaki (AKLT) states [25] are physically motivated
important resource states [14–22], since they are gapped ground states of a physically natural Hamiltonian which has
long been studied in condensed matter physics, and exhibit many novel features, such as the one-dimensional Haldane
phase [26], the diluted antiferromagnetic order detected by the string order parameter [27], and the effective spin-1/2
degree of freedom (edge state) appearing on the boundary of the chain [28]. Furthermore, it was shown recently that
the preparation of the AKLT resource states is more efficient and simpler than that of the cluster state in linear optics
with biphotons [29].
It is, however, not obvious that these novel resource states also admit blind quantum computation like the cluster
state. They have drastically different properties compared to the cluster state or graph states in general, such as the
local purity, the correlation property, and the entanglement property [14–23]. Furthermore, the actual computation
over these new resources, such as the way of measurements and the way of compensating byproducts, are also strongly
different from those over the cluster state [14–23].
In this paper, we show for the first time that the ground state measurement-based blind quantum computation is
possible with AKLT resource states. As we will see later, this is not a straightforward generalization of the blind
quantum computation on the cluster state, although it borrows the general idea from [3]. Hence a new proof of security
for the blind quantum computation with AKLT states was also required. As a result, our new protocol can enjoy
the advantages of the AKLT resource states, namely the easy preparation of the resource state by cooling condensed
matter systems, the natural protection of the quantum computation by the energy gap, and the simple and efficient
preparation of the resource state in linear optics with biphotons.
More precisely, we propose two methods, the single-server protocol and the double-server protocol. In the single-
server protocol (Fig. 1), there are two parties, called Alice and Bob. Alice, the client, has a classical computer
and a quantum instrument which is not sufficient for the universal quantum computation, whereas Bob, the server,
has a universal quantum computer. Alice’s quantum instrument emits random four-qubit states so-called “Dango
states” each of which is directly sent to Bob through the quantum channel (Fig. 1 (a)), and Bob stores all of them
in his quantum memory. Each Dango state hides certain random number which is secret to Bob, and these secret
numbers are used later for the blind quantum computation. From Dango states, Bob creates the resource state,
which is unitary equivalent to an AKLT state (Fig. 1 (b)). Alice calculates the angle in which a particle should be
measured by using her classical computer, and sends the angle to Bob through the classical channel. Bob performs
the measurement according to Alice’s information, and returns the result of the measurement to Alice. They repeat
this two-way classical communication (Fig. 1 (c)) until they finish the computation. Bob finally sends the final output
of the quantum computation to Alice. The whole protocol can be done in such a way that Bob learns nothing about
Alice’s input, output, and algorithm. Recently an efficient scheme for preparation of AKLT state with biphotons was
proposed in [29] and it seems that our single-server protocol can be adapted to such a scheme but we leave it as an
open question what the best implementation is.
3As we argue later, the single-server protocol cannot enjoy the energy-gap protection in condensed-matter systems,
since Bob cannot prepare any natural parent Hamiltonian without knowing hidden angles in Dango states. Moreover,
although Alice’s quantum instrument is too primitive to perform the universal quantum computation, and it does
not seem to be hard to implement this instrument in certain optical setups, it would be ideal if we can make Alice
completely classical. Therefore, similar to [3], we consider an extension of the protocol to the double-server protocol.
In the double-server protocol (Fig. 2), there are three parties Alice, Bob1, and Bob2. Alice, the client, has only a
classical computer, whereas Bob1 and Bob2, servers, have universal quantum computers. Furthermore, Bob1 and
Bob2 share many Bell pairs but they have no classical or quantum channel between them. In the double-server
protocol, Bob1 first creates AKLT resource states (Fig. 2 (a)). Bob1 next adiabatically turns off the interaction
between some particles and others in his resource state, and teleports these particles to Bob2 by consuming Bell pairs.
Bob1 sends Alice the result of the measurement in the teleportation through the classical channel (Fig. 2 (b)). Note
that due to the lack of any communication (classical or quantum) channels between Bob1 and Bob2, the teleportation
procedure from Bobs’ point of view can be seen as a usage of a totally mixed channel where only Alice knows how
to correct the output of the channel. Next, Alice calculates the angle in which particles should be measured by
using her classical computer, and sends Bob2 the angle which is the sum of the calculated angle plus a random angle
through the classical channel (Fig. 2 (c)). Bob2 performs the measurement in that angle and sends the result of the
measurement to Alice (Fig. 2 (d)). Alice sends the previous random angle to Bob1 (Fig. 2 (e)), and Bob1 does the
single-qubit rotation which compensates that random angle (Fig. 2 (f)). Bob1 and Bob2 repeat this two-way classical
communication with Alice until they finish the computation. The whole protocol can be done in such a way that
two Bobs learn nothing about Alice’s input, output, and algorithm. As we will argue later, the scheme of double
servers proposed in [3] where Bob1 prepares random states and Bob2 performs the measurement that compensates
that random angle, will not lead to a ground state BQC protocol without affecting the privacy condition. While our
new protocol can fully benefit from the energy-gap protection in condensed-matter systems, without revealing any
information about Alice’s secret computation.
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FIG. 1: (Color online.) The single-server protocol. (a): Alice’s quantum instrument (QI) emits many four-qubit states so-
called “Dango” states each of which is directly sent to Bob through the quantum channel (QC). Bob stores all of them in his
quantum memory. (b): From these Dango states, Bob creates the resource state. (c): Alice calculates the angle in which a
particle should be measured by using her classical computer (C Comp) and sends the angle to Bob through the classical channel
(CC). Bob performs the measurement and returns the result of the measurement to Alice. They repeat this two-way classical
communication until they finish the computation. Bob finally sends the final output of the computation to Alice.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we briefly review the concept of correlation space [15–17] which is
used throughout this paper in order to describe measurement-based quantum computation on AKLT states. We also
briefly review the AKLT model and measurement-based quantum computing with AKLT resource. In Sec. III, we
explain the single-server protocol. We show the blindness of the single-server protocol in Sec. IV. We also explain the
double-server protocol in Sec. V and show its blindness in Sec. VI. We finish with a discussion in Sec. VII which also
highlights open problems.
4FIG. 2: (Color online.) The double-server protocol. (a): Bob1 creates AKLT resource states. Bob1 and Bob2 share Bell
pairs (BPs). (b): Bob1 adiabatically turns off the interaction between some particles and others in his resource state, and
teleports these isolated particles to Bob2 by consuming Bell pairs. Bob1 also sends Alice the result of the measurement in the
teleportation. (c): Alice calculates the angle in which particles should be measured by using her classical computer (C Comp)
and sends Bob2 the angle which is the sum of thus calculated angle and a random angle. (d): Bob2 performs the measurement
in that angle and sends the result of the measurement to Alice. (e): Alice sends Bob1 the previous random angle. (f): Bob1
implements the single-qubit rotation which compensates the random rotation.
II. QUANTUM COMPUTATION IN CORRELATION SPACE
In this section, we will briefly review the concept of correlation space [15–17], which is used throughout this paper.
For details see Refs. [15–17].
Let us consider the matrix-product state of a quantum state in the dN -dimensional Hilbert space
d∑
l1=1
...
d∑
lN=1
〈L|A[lN ]...A[l1]|R〉|lN 〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |l1〉,
where |L〉 and |R〉 are two-dimensional complex vectors and A’s are two-dimensional complex matrices. Let us assume
that the first qudit of the matrix-product state is projected onto
|θ, φ〉 = cos θ
2
|0〉+ eiφ sin θ
2
|1〉.
Then, the matrix-product state becomes
d∑
l2=1
...
d∑
lN=1
〈L|A[lN ]...A[l2]A[θ, φ]|R〉|lN 〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |l2〉 ⊗ |θ, φ〉,
5where
A[θ, φ] = cos
θ
2
A[0] + e−iφ sin
θ
2
A[1].
If A[0] and A[1] are appropriately chosen in such a way that A[θ, φ] is unitary, we can “simulate” the unitary rotation
A[θ, φ]|R〉 of |R〉 in the linear space where |L〉, |R〉, and A’s live. This linear space is called “correlation space” [15–
17]. In the general framework of measurement-based quantum computation, which is called the computational tensor
network [15–17], universal quantum computation is performed in this correlation space. Note that in the one-way
quantum computing model, the correlation space and the physical space are the same. This separation between the
correlation space and the physical space will allow us to use many new resource states for measurement-based quantum
computing. One such resource state is the AKLT state [14].
Let us consider the one-dimensional open-boundary chain of N qutrits. The AKLT Hamiltonian [25] is defined by
HAKLT (β) ≡
N−1∑
j=1
hj+1,j(β),
where
hj+1,j(β) ≡ 1
2
[Sj+1 · Sj − β(Sj+1 · Sj)2] + 1
3
and Sj ≡ (Sxj , Syj , Szj ) is the spin-1 operator on site j defined by
Sxj ≡
1√
2
(
0 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 0
)
,
Syj ≡
−i√
2
(
0 1 0
−1 0 1
0 −1 0
)
,
Szj ≡
(
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 −1
)
.
If −1 < β < 1, the system is in the gapped Haldane phase [26]. In particular, if β = −1/3, Each hj+1,j(−1/3) is
the projection operator onto the eigenspace of the total spin operator of two spin-1/2 particles corresponding to the
eigenvalue 2. For β = −1/3, the ground states are called AKLT states [25] and explicitly written in the following
matrix product form [14, 25]:
|AKLTN,L,R〉 ≡
√
2√
3N
3∑
l1=1
...
3∑
lN=1
〈L|A[lN ]...A[l1]|R〉|lN 〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |l1〉, (1)
where
|1〉 ≡ − 1√
2
(
|Sz = +1〉 − |Sz = −1〉
)
,
|2〉 ≡ 1√
2
(
|Sz = +1〉+ |Sz = −1〉
)
,
|3〉 ≡ |Sz = 0〉,
|Sz = k〉 (k ∈ {−1, 0,+1}) are eigenvectors of the z-component Sz of the spin-1 operator, |L〉 and |R〉 are two-
dimensional complex vectors, and {A[1], A[2], A[3]} are 2× 2 matrices defined by
A[1] ≡ X,
A[2] ≡ XZ,
A[3] ≡ Z.
Here, X and Z are Pauli operators over qubits. Note that the ground states of the AKLT Hamiltonian are four-fold
degenerate, and each ground state is specified with |L〉 and |R〉, which represent two qubit edge states. The AKLT
states are frustration free, since
hj+1,j(−1/3)|AKLTN,L,R〉 = 0
6for any |L〉 and |R〉, and for all j = 1, ..., N − 1.
The AKLT model has long been studied in condensed matter physics since it can describe the one-dimensional
Haldane phase [26] of a qutrit chain, which exhibits the spectral gap [25], the diluted antiferromagnetic order detected
by the string order parameter [27], and the effective spin-1/2 degree of freedom, namely the edge state, appearing on
the boundary of the chain [28]. Furthermore, the AKLT model has recently been attracting much attentions in the
field of quantum information, because of its connections to the matrix product representation [30–32], the localizable
entanglement [33, 34], and the measurement-based quantum computation [14, 15, 18–20]. Indeed, it was shown in
Refs. [14, 18–20] that the measurement-based quantum computation is possible on the AKLT chains or other ground
states in the gapped Haldane phase (−1 < β < 1).
We briefly review universal measurement-based quantum computation on AKLT states [14]. Assume that a qutrit
of Eq. (1) is measured in the basis M(φ) = {|α(φ)〉, |β(φ)〉, |γ〉}, where
|α(φ)〉 = 1 + e
iφ
2
|1〉+ 1− e
iφ
2
|2〉,
|β(φ)〉 = 1− e
iφ
2
|1〉+ 1 + e
iφ
2
|2〉,
|γ〉 = |3〉.
Then, following operations are implemented in the correlation space according to the measurement result [14].
|α(φ)〉 : XeiφZ/2,
|β(φ)〉 : XZeiφZ/2,
|γ〉 : Z.
Now assume that the unitary operation
V = |3〉〈1|+ |1〉〈2|+ |2〉〈3|
is applied on a qutrit and that qutrit is measured in the basis M(φ). Then, following operations are implemented in
the correlation space according to the measurement result [14].
|α(φ)〉 : XZe−iφX/2,
|β(φ)〉 : Ze−iφX/2,
|γ〉 : X.
In this way, any single-qubit Z and X rotations are possible up to some Pauli byproducts. By appropriately
changing the sign of φ (adapting measurements of the physical qutrits), these byproducts can be moved forward so
that they are corrected in the final stage of the computation over the correlation space.
III. SINGLE-SEVER BLIND QUANTUM COMPUTING PROTOCOL
As said before, in the single-server BQC protocol (Fig. 1), Alice has a classical computer and a quantum instrument
that emits random four-qubit states called “Dango states”. Depending on the desired computation and the input size,
Alice will send (2 × N ×M) Dango states directly to Bob through a one-way quantum channel that they initially
share. Bob stores all of them in his quantum memory to creates the resource state, called “rotated AKLT states”.
The procedure of preparing such an initial state is explained in the Blind state preparation Subsection below.
Next, Alice calculates the angle in which a particle of a rotated AKLT state should be measured. Recall that
this is a qutrit measurement that will induce a qubit operation over the correlation space. Moreover the calculated
angle should compensate for the initial random rotation of the Dango states and byproduct operation of the previous
measurement. Finally an additional random rotation will be added to hide the true result of the measurement from
Bob. Bob performs the measurement according to Alice’s information (sent via a classical channel to him), and
returns the result of the measurement to Alice. They repeat this two-way classical communication until they finish
the computation. Bob finally sends the final output of the quantum computation to Alice. The exact protocol is
given in the Blind computation Subsection below where we describe how a blind arbitrary X and Z rotation in the
correlation space can be performed. Next we describe how two-qubit entangling operation of CZ can be performed
in regular places. The rotation operators are also performed in regular interval, and hence the overall structure of
the actual underlying computation remains hidden to Bob. These set of operators define a universal set of gates for
quantum computing.
7A. Blind state preparation
FIG. 3: (Color online.) (a): A Dango state. Two yellow circles connected by a bond are qubits which consist of the Bell state.
The operator (I − |η1〉〈η1|)TZ/X(ξ) acts on two qubits in the red dotted circle. (b): A Z-Dango chain for n = 4. (c): A Combo
chain |Cb〉. Z-Dango chains are colored in blue, whereas X-Dango chains are colored in green.
Denote the Bell basis by
|η1〉 ≡ 1√
2
(
|0〉 ⊗ |0〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |1〉
)
,
|η2〉 ≡ 1√
2
(
|0〉 ⊗ |0〉 − |1〉 ⊗ |1〉
)
,
|η3〉 ≡ 1√
2
(
|1〉 ⊗ |0〉+ |0〉 ⊗ |1〉
)
,
|η4〉 ≡ 1√
2
(
|1〉 ⊗ |0〉 − |0〉 ⊗ |1〉
)
.
The full state preparation is described in Protocol 1. Assume Alice’s desired computation is composed of a sequence
of X and Z-rotations and CZ operations. Depending on the number of the required operators and the size of the
input, Alice will choose integer values N and M . Then Alice’s quantum instrument emits N ×M “Z-Dango states”
and N ×M “X-Dango states” defined as (see Fig. 3 (a))
|DZ(ξZa,b)〉 ≡ (I ⊗ (I − |η1〉〈η1|)⊗ I)(I ⊗ TZ(ξZa,b)⊗ I)|η1〉 ⊗ |η1〉,
|DX(ξXa,b)〉 ≡ (I ⊗ (I − |η1〉〈η1|)⊗ I)(I ⊗ TX(ξXa,b)⊗ I)|η1〉 ⊗ |η1〉,
where (a, b) ∈ {1, ..., N} × {1, ...,M}, ξZ/Xa,b ∈ A ≡
{
kπ
4
∣∣∣k = 0, ..., 7} are independently and uniformly distributed
random numbers which are secret to Bob, and the two qubit operators TZ(ξ
Z
a,b) and TX(ξ
X
a,b) are defined by
TZ(ξ
Z
a,b) ≡ |00〉〈00|+ eiξ
Z
a,b |01〉〈01|+ |10〉〈10|+ |11〉〈11|,
TX(ξ
X
a,b) ≡
(1 + eiξXa,b
2
|η2〉+ 1− e
iξXa,b
2
|η4〉
)
〈η2|+
(1− eiξXa,b
2
|η2〉+ 1 + e
iξXa,b
2
|η4〉
)
〈η4|+ |η1〉〈η1|+ |η3〉〈η3|.
Alice sends all these Dango states to Bob, and records all {ξZ/Xa,b } for the later use [35]. Bob arranges all the Dango
states in a lattice with 2N columns and M rows.
Alice chooses a parameter n < N . We call a collection of n Dango states, sent by Alice to be kept in Bob’s memory,
8“ (k, b)th Z-Dango chain states” or “(k, b)th X-Dango chain states” defines as (see Fig. 3 (b))
|BZk,b〉 ≡
n⊗
j=1
|DZ(ξZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉,
|BXk,b〉 ≡
n⊗
j=1
|DX(ξX(k−1)n+j,b)〉,
where k = 1, ..., N/n and b = 1, ...,M . A Z-Dango chain state is used for the implementation of a single-qubit
Z-rotation whereas an X-Dango chain state is used for the implementation a single-qubit X-rotation. However, to
hide the actual structure of the computation Alice will work with a regular one-dimensional chain, called “Combo
chain state” |Cb〉, composed of N/n Z-Dango chain states and N/n X-Dango chain states (Fig. 3 (c)) with two-edge
qubits projected on |R∗〉 and |L〉 states, respectively (Fig. 4 (a)):
|Cb〉 ≡ 〈R∗|〈L|
(
|BXN/n,b〉 ⊗ |BZN/n,b〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |BX2,b〉 ⊗ |BZ2,b〉 ⊗ |BX1,b〉 ⊗ |BZ1,b〉
)
(b = 1, ...,M). Here, |L〉 = (|0〉 + i|1〉)/√2 and |R〉 = |0〉. However, |R〉 could be any arbitrary state depending on
Alice’s desired input using the uploading method [37].
Now in order to entangle qubits of the Combo chain to create the desired resource state, Bob will perform the
following operators. Let us define the PEPS operation to be [30–32]
P ≡ 1√
2
3∑
l=1
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
Ai,j [l]|l〉〈i| ⊗ 〈j|,
which creates a qutrit from two qubits, where Ai,j [l] is (i, j)-element of the matrix A[l]. Consider the following unitary
operators acting on a qutrit
U(ξ
Z/X
a,b ) ≡
(1 + eiξZ/Xa,b
2
|1〉+ 1− e
iξ
Z/X
a,b
2
|2〉
)
〈1|+
(1− eiξZ/Xa,b
2
|1〉+ 1 + e
iξ
Z/X
a,b
2
|2〉
)
〈2|+ |3〉〈3|,
V ≡ |3〉〈1|+ |1〉〈2|+ |2〉〈3|.
It is easy to verify that
PTZ(ξ
Z/X
a,b ) = U(ξ
Z/X
a,b )P,
PTX(ξ
Z/X
a,b ) = V
†U(ξZ/Xa,b )V P.
Bob has to apply the filtering operation I − |η1〉〈η1|. In order to do so, he performs the measurement {|η1〉〈η1|, I −
|η1〉〈η1|} to every pair of two qubits in the Combo chain which is specified by a dotted blue circle in Fig. 4 (b). If
|η1〉〈η1| is realised, two qubits are just removed from the chain (Fig. 4 (c)). Next Bob applies the PEPS operation
P to each pair of two qubits in order to obtain qutrits (Fig. 4 (d), (e), (f)) [38]. This PEPS operation is done
deterministically since I − |η1〉〈η1| is already applied to every pair of qubits. Therefore Bob has created a new
one-dimensional chain of qutrits (Fig. 4 (f)) called “rotated AKLT state”:
|RAKLT 2N,L,Rb ({ξZ/Xa,b })〉 = Ub({ξZ/Xa,b })|AKLT 2N,L,R〉,
where
Ub({ξZ/Xa,b }) ≡
{
V †U(ξXN,b)V ⊗ ...⊗ V †U(ξXN−n+1,b)V
}
⊗
{
U(ξZN,b)⊗ ...⊗ U(ξZN−n+1,b)
}
...
⊗
{
V †U(ξXn+n,b)V ⊗ ...⊗ V †U(ξXn+1,b)V
}
⊗
{
U(ξZn+n,b)⊗ ...⊗ U(ξZn+1,b)
}
⊗
{
V †U(ξXn,b)V ⊗ ...⊗ V †U(ξX1,b)V
}
⊗
{
U(ξZn,b)⊗ ...⊗ U(ξZ1,b)
}
(for simplicity, we have assumed that all filterings give |η1〉〈η1|). We call a qutrit which is rotated by U(ξZa,b) “Z-
prerotated qutrit” and a qutrit which is rotated by V †U(ξXa,b)V “X-prerotated qutrit”. Other qutrits are called “plain
qutrits”. The “(k, b)th Z/X-prerotated AKLT subsystem” is defined to be the set of Z/X-prerotated qutrits in bth
prerotated AKLT chain corresponding to particles of (k, b)th Z/X-Dango chain.
9Protocol 1: Blind State Preparation
• Alice sends Bob parameter values N , M and n < N .
• Alice sends Bob N ×M many Z-Dango states |DZ(ξ
Z
a,b)〉 where (a, b) ∈ {1, ..., N} × {1, ...,M}.
• Alice sends Bob N ×M many X-Dango states |DX (ξ
X
a,b)〉 where (a, b) ∈ {1, ..., N} × {1, ...,M}.
• Bob arranges the received Z-Dango states in M rows of N/n Z-Dango chains |BZk,b〉 where k = 1, 2, ..., N/n, b = 1, ..., M .
• Bob arranges the received X-Dango states inM rows of N/n X-Dango chains |BXk,b〉 where k = 1, 2, ..., N/n, b = 1, ..., M .
• Bob arranges the Dango chains in M rows of Combo chains |Cb〉 ≡ |B
X
N/n,b〉 ⊗ |B
Z
N/n,b〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |B
X
1,b〉 ⊗ |B
Z
1,b〉.
• Bob applies filtering and PEPS operators to create M rows of rotated AKLT states |RAKLT 2N,L,Rb ({ξ
Z/X
a,b })〉, where
b = 1, ..., M .
See also Fig. 4.
(b)
FIG. 4: (Color online.) (a): A chain |C〉. (b): The filtering operation is applied to every pair of qubits which is indicated by a
blue dotted circle. (c): |η1〉〈η1| is realized on the seventh and eighth qubits. (d): The PEPS P is applied to every pair of two
qubits. (e): It is equivalent to (d). (f): It is equivalent to (e). Now large yellow circles are qutrits.
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B. Blind computation protocol
A single blind Z-rotation is performed using a Z-Dango chain state. Let us assume that Alice wants to perform the
Z-rotation exp
[
iZ
2 θ
Z
k,b
]
with θZk,b ∈ A, using the (k, b)th Z-Dango chain [36]. The step by step operation is given in
Protocol 2. Note that we implement the desired Z-rotation using qutrit measurements. However, the third outcome
|γ〉 leads to the failure as it implements only the trivial Pauli Z. The probability that Alice fails to implement her
desired Z-rotation in a single Z-Dango chain is 1/3n, which is small for sufficiently large n. Similarly a blind X
rotation could be applied (see Protocol 3) where again, the probability that Alice fails to implement her desired
X-rotation in a single X-Dango chain is 1/3n. Note that these protocols are designed in such a way to follow the
construction of the AKLT computation of Sec. II, while canceling the prerotation that was added to the resource state
for the purpose of blindness.
Protocol 2: Blind Z Rotation
Initially the flag parameter (known to both Alice and Bob) is set τ = 1. For j = 1 · · ·n Alice and Bob perform the following
steps.
(I) Alice sends Bob the angle
φZ(k−1)n+j,b ≡ τθ
Z
k,b + ξ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b + πr
Z
(k−1)n+j,b (mod 2π),
where rZ(k−1)n+j,b ∈ {0, 1} is a random number which is secret to Bob. If there is the X byproduct before this step, θ
Z
k,b
should be replaced with −θZk,b in order to compensate this byproduct operator. However, Z byproduct commutes trivially
with the operation implemented in the correlation space, and therefore it can be corrected at the end of computation.
(II) Bob measures the jth Z-prerotated qutrit of the (k, b)th Z-prerotated AKLT subsystem in the basis
M(φZ(k−1)n+j,b) ≡ {|α(φ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)〉, |β(φ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)〉, |γ〉},
where
|α(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 ≡
1 + exp
[
iφZ(k−1)n+j,b
]
2
|1〉 +
1− exp
[
iφZ(k−1)n+j,b
]
2
|2〉,
|β(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 ≡
1− exp
[
iφZ(k−1)n+j,b
]
2
|1〉 +
1 + exp
[
iφZ(k−1)n+j,b
]
2
|2〉,
|γ〉 ≡ |3〉.
and sends the result to Alice.
• If the measurement result is |α(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉,
RαZ(τθ
Z
k,b, r
Z
(k−1)n+j,b) ≡ exp
[−iτθZk,b
2
]
XZ
rZ(k−1)n+j,b exp
[ iZ
2
τθZk,b
]
is implemented in the correlation space and Alice sets τ = 0.
• If the measurement result is |β(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉,
RβZ(τθ
Z
k,b, r
Z
(k−1)n+j,b) ≡ exp
[−iτθZk,b
2
]
XZ
rZ(k−1)n+j,b+1 exp
[ iZ
2
τθZk,b
]
is implemented in the correlation space and Alice sets τ = 0.
• If the measurement result is |γ〉, Z is implemented in the correlation space.
The probability of obtaining each result is 1/3.
(III) Bob does the measurement {|1〉, |2〉, |3〉} on the next plain qutrit if any.
Let us finally explain how the two-qubit operation of controlled-Z (CZ) is performed. In order to perform CZ
gates blindly, CZ gates are periodically implemented with the period that is independent of Alice’s input and the
algorithm. In this case, Bob learns nothing from the period. Because of the periodic implementation of CZ gates,
Alice sometimes experiences an unwanted CZ gate. However, Alice can cancel the effect of an unwanted CZ gate by
implementing the trivial identity operation (plus Pauli byproduct operations) until she arrives at the next CZ gate
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Protocol 3: Blind X Rotation
Initially the flag parameter (known to both Alice and Bob) is set τ = 1. For j = 1 · · ·n Alice and Bob perform the following
steps.
(I) Alice sends Bob the angle
φX(k−1)n+j,b ≡ τθ
X
k,b + ξ
X
(k−1)n+j,b + r
X
(k−1)n+j,bπ (mod 2π),
where rX(k−1)n+j,b ∈ {0, 1} is a random number which is secret to Bob. If there is the Z byproduct operator before
this step, θXk,b should be replaced with −θ
X
k,b in order to compensate this byproduct operator. However, X byproduct
commutes trivially with the operation implemented in the correlation space, and therefore it can be corrected at the end
of computation.
(II) Bob applies V on the jth X-prerotated qutrit of the (k, b)th X-prerotated AKLT subsystem, and does the measurement
in the basis
M(φX(k−1)n+j,b) ≡ {|α(φ
X
(k−1)n+j,b)〉, |β(φ
X
(k−1)n+j,b)〉, |γ〉},
where
|α(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉 ≡
1 + exp
[
iφX(k−1)n+j,b
]
2
|1〉 +
1− exp
[
iφX(k−1)n+j,b
]
2
|2〉,
|β(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉 ≡
1− exp
[
iφX(k−1)n+j,b
]
2
|1〉 +
1 + exp
[
iφX(k−1)n+j,b
]
2
|2〉,
|γ〉 ≡ |3〉.
and sends the result to Alice.
• If the measurement result is |α(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉,
RαX(τθ
X
k,b, r
X
(k−1)n+j,b) ≡ exp
[−iτθXk,b
2
]
X
rX(k−1)n+j,b+1Z exp
[−iX
2
τθXk,b
]
is implemented in the correlation space and Alice sets τ = 0.
• If the measurement result is |β(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉,
RβX(τθ
X
k,b, r
X
(k−1)n+j,b) ≡ exp
[−iτθXk,b
2
]
X
rX(k−1)n+j,bZ exp
[−iX
2
τθXk,b
]
is implemented in the correlation space and Alice sets τ = 0.
• If the measurement result is |γ〉, X is implemented.
The probability of obtaining each result is 1/3.
(III) Bob performs the measurement {|1〉, |2〉, |3〉} on the next plain qutrit if any.
which cancels the previous one. This is possible due to the following commutation rules.
CZ(I ⊗X)CZ = Z ⊗X,
CZ(I ⊗ Z)CZ = I ⊗ Z,
CZ(X ⊗ I)CZ = X ⊗ Z,
CZ(Z ⊗ I)CZ = Z ⊗ I.
In Protocol 4, we explain how to implement the CZ gate plus Z-rotation
(
exp
[ iZ
2
θZk,b
]
⊗ exp
[ iZ
2
θZk′,b′
])
CZ
between (k, b)th and (k′, b′)th Z-prerotated AKLT subsystems, where θZk,b, θ
Z
k′,b′ ∈ A. Note that the local Z rotations
are required to cancel the prerotations of qutrits. The probability that Alice fails to implement the CZ gate in this
algorithm is (5/9)n, which is small for large n.
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Protocol 4: Controlled-Z followed by Blind Z-rotations
Initially the flag parameters (known to both Alice and Bob) are set τ = 1, τ ′ = 1 and ǫ = 1. For j = 1 · · ·n Alice and Bob
perform the following steps.
(I) If ǫ = 0, skip this step. Bob applies the unitary operation
W ≡
|1, 1〉+ |1, 2〉+ |2, 1〉 − |2, 2〉
2
〈1, 1|
+
|1, 1〉 + |1, 2〉 − |2, 1〉 + |2, 2〉
2
〈1, 2|
+
|1, 1〉 − |1, 2〉 + |2, 1〉 + |2, 2〉
2
〈2, 1|
+
−|1, 1〉 + |1, 2〉 + |2, 1〉+ |2, 2〉
2
〈2, 2|
+|1, 3〉〈1, 3|+ |2, 3〉〈2, 3|+ |3, 1〉〈3, 1|+ |3, 2〉〈3, 2|+ |3, 3〉〈3, 3|
between jth Z-prerotated qutrit of (k, b)th Z-prerotated AKLT subsystem and jth Z-prerotated qutrit of (k′, b′)th
Z-prerotated AKLT subsystem.
(II) Alice sends Bob the angles
φZ(k−1)n+j,b = τθ
Z
k,b + ξ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b + r
Z
(k−1)n+j,bπ (mod 2π),
φZ(k′−1)n+j,b′ = τ
′θZk′,b′ + ξ
Z
(k′−1)n+j,b′ + r
Z
(k′−1)n+j,b′π (mod 2π),
where rZ(k−1)n+j,b, r
Z
(k′−1)n+j,b′ ∈ {0, 1} are random numbers. If there is any byproduct which contains X before this step,
the sign of θZk,b or θ
Z
k′,b′ should be appropriately changed. However, Z byproduct commutes trivially with the operation
implemented in the correlation space, and therefore it can be corrected at the end of computation.
(III) Bob does the measurementM(φZ(k−1)n+j,b) (the same as that of Protocol 1) on the jth Z-prerotated qutrit of the (k, b)th
Z-prerotated AKLT subsystem and the measurement M(φZ(k′−1)n+j,b′) on the jth Z-prerotated qutrit of the (k
′, b′)th
Z-prerotated AKLT subsystem. The operation implemented in the correlation space is summarized as follows:
• |α(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 ⊗ |α(φ
Z
(k′−1)n+j,b′ )〉:
[
RαZ(τθ
Z
k,b, r
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)⊗R
α
Z(τ
′θZk′,b′ , r
Z
(k′−1)n+j,b′)
]
CZǫ
• |α(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 ⊗ |β(φ
Z
(k′−1)n+j,b′)〉:
[
RαZ(τθ
Z
k,b, r
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)⊗R
β
Z(τ
′θZk′,b′ , r
Z
(k′−1)n+j,b′ )
]
CZǫ
• |α(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 ⊗ |γ〉: R
α
Z(τθ
Z
k,b, r
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)⊗ Z
• |β(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 ⊗ |α(φ
Z
(k′−1)n+j,b′)〉:
[
RβZ(τθ
Z
k,b, r
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)⊗R
α
Z(τ
′θZk′,b′ , r
Z
(k′−1)n+j,b′ )
]
CZǫ
• |β(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 ⊗ |β(φ
Z
(k′−1)n+j,b′)〉:
[
RβZ(τθ
Z
k,b, r
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)⊗R
β
Z(τ
′θZk′,b′ , r
Z
(k′−1)n+j,b′ )
]
CZǫ
• |β(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 ⊗ |γ〉: R
β
Z(τθ
Z
k,b, r
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)⊗ Z
• |γ〉 ⊗ |α(φZ(k′−1)n+j,b′)〉: Z ⊗R
α
Z(τ
′θZk′,b′ , r
Z
(k′−1)n+j,b′)
• |γ〉 ⊗ |β(φZ(k′−1)n+j,b′)〉: Z ⊗R
β
Z(τ
′θZk′,b′ , r
Z
(k′−1)n+j,b′)
• |γ〉 ⊗ |γ〉: Z ⊗ Z
(IV) If the Z-rotation by θZk,b is implemented in the preivous step, then Alice sets τ = 0. If the z-rotation by θ
Z
k′,b′ is
implemented in the previous step, then Alice sets τ ′ = 0. If the CZ is implemented in the previous step, then Alice sets
ǫ = 0.
(V) Bob does the measurement {|1〉, |2〉, |3〉} on the next plain qutrit if any.
C. Ground state computing
In the single-server protocol, it is not easy for Bob to enjoy the energy-gap protection, since Bob cannot prepare
any natural parent Hamiltonian without knowing {ξZ/Xa,b }. This is understood as follows.
Let us consider the span {
|RAKLT 2N,L,Rb ({ξZ/Xa,b })〉
∣∣∣ ξZ/Xa,b ∈ A, a = 1, ..., N }
of all rotated AKLT states. As is shown below, the dimension of the span is 22N . Therefore, if Bob does not know
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{ξZ/Xa,b }, he must prepare an unnatural Hamiltonian with exponentially-degenerated ground states.
Let us show that the dimension of the span is 22N . Let
|ψ2N 〉 = |φ0〉 ⊗
( 2N⊗
i=1
|φi〉
)
⊗ |φ2N+1〉,
where |φ0〉 and |φ2N+1〉 are qubit states, and |φi〉 (i = 1, ..., 2N) are qutrit states. Let
U~ξ = I2 ⊗ Ub({ξ
Z/X
a,b })⊗ I2
be a grobal unitary operator, where I2 is the identity operator on a single qubit. Let E is a global unitary operator
which works as
E|ψ2N 〉 = |AKLT 2N,L,R〉.
From Lemma below and the fact that E† is unitary,
dim
(
span
{
U~ξE|ψ2N 〉
}
~ξ
)
= dim
(
span
{
(U~ξE)
†|ψ2N 〉
}
~ξ
)
= dim
(
span
{
E†U†~ξ|ψ2N 〉
}
~ξ
)
= dim
(
span
{
U
†
~ξ
|ψ2N 〉
}
~ξ
)
= dim
(
span
{
U~ξ|ψ2N 〉
}
~ξ
)
= 22N .
Lemma: Let {V1, . . . Vr} be a set of r operators, and let |φ〉 be a state in their domain. Then
dim
(
span
{
Vi|φ〉
}
i
)
= dim
(
span
{
V †i |φ〉
}
i
)
.
Proof: Recall that dim
(
span
{
Vi|φ〉
}
i
)
is equal to the rank of the Gram matrix of the set of vectors {Vi|φ〉}i. Also
note that if GA is the Gram matrix of the set of vectors {Vi|φ〉}i and GB is the Gram matrix of the set of vectors
{V †i |φ〉}i, then GA = G∗B. Finally, let us remind that rank(A) = rank(A∗) for all matrices A.
IV. BLINDNESS OF THE SINGLE-SERVER PROTOCOL
In this section, we show the blindness of the single-server protocol (composed of Protocols 2, 3, 4). Informally
speaking, a protocol is defined to be blind if Bob, given all the classical and quantum information during the protocol,
cannot learn anything about the Alice’s actual computational angles, input and the output [3]. In the original paper
for the blind quantum computation over the cluster states [3] blindness is formally defined in terms of the independence
of classical and quantum states of Bob from Alice’s secret. Here we adapt the definition to our setting but we omit a
formal proof of the equivalences between the two definitions.
Definition 1 A single-server protocol is blind if
(S1) The conditional probability distribution of Alice’s nontrivial computational angles, given all the classical infor-
mation Bob can obtain during the protocol, and given the measurement results of any POVMs which Bob may
perform on his system at any stage of the protocol, is uniform,
and
(S2) The register state in the correlation space is one-time padded to Bob.
In order to show (S1), we have to show three lemmas.
In the following we define Φ,Θ,Ξ and R to be independently and uniformly distributed random variables, corre-
sponding to the angles sent by Alice to Bob, Alice’s secret computational angle, random prerotation and a hidden
binary parameter, respectively. From the construction of the protocol, the following relation is satisfied:
Φ = Θ+ Ξ+Rπ (mod 2π).
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We denote by ρΞ the state that Alice sends to Bob parametrized by Ξ. The most general method Bob may resort to in
order to learn Alice’s secret computational angles is described by a POVM measurement {Πj}mj=1 on ρΞ. This POVM
can depend on all classical messages received from Alice. Let O ∈ {1, ...,m} be the random variable corresponding
to the result of the POVM measurement. Bob’s knowledge about Alice’s secret angles is given by the conditional
probability distribution of Θ = θ given O = j and Φ = φ:
P (Θ = θ|O = j,Φ = φ).
Lemma 1 If ρΞ is a Dango state |DZ/X(Ξ)〉〈DZ/X (Ξ)|, then P (Θ = θ|O = j,Φ = φ) = 18 for any θ, φ ∈ A,
j ∈ {1, ...,m}, and POVM on ρΞ.
Proof: From Bayes’ theorem, we have
P (Θ = θ|O = j,Φ = φ) = P (O = j|Θ = θ,Φ = φ)P (Θ = θ,Φ = φ)
P (O = j,Φ = φ)
=
P (O = j|Θ = θ,Φ = φ)P (Θ = θ)P (Φ = φ)
P (O = j|Φ = φ)P (Φ = φ)
=
1
8
Tr
[
Πj
1
2
∑
r ρφ−θ−rπ
]
Tr
[
Πj
1
8
1
2
∑
θ,r ρφ−θ−rπ
] .
If ρΞ is a Dango state |DZ/X(Ξ)〉〈DZ/X (Ξ)|, we obtain
1
2
∑
r
ρφ−θ−rπ =
1
2
1
8
∑
θ,r
ρφ−θ−rπ
for any φ, θ ∈ [0, 2π], and hence P (Θ = θ|O = j,Φ = φ) = 1/8. The above equation is valid since
|DZ(ξ)〉〈DZ(ξ)| =
[
I ⊗ (I − |η1〉〈η1|)⊗ I
]1
4


1 e−iξ 1 1
eiξ 1 eiξ eiξ
1 e−iξ 1 1
1 e−iξ 1 1

⊕ 012[I ⊗ (I − |η1〉〈η1|)⊗ I],
where 012 is the 12 × 12 zero matrix and the 4 × 4 matrix is in the basis {|0000〉, |0011〉, |1100〉, |1111〉}, and there
exists a unitary which maps (I ⊗ TZ(ξ)⊗ I)|η1〉 ⊗ |η1〉 to (I ⊗ TX(ξ)⊗ I)|η1〉 ⊗ |η1〉. 
Lemma 2 Consider a collection of L states {ρΞl}l such that for each l = 1, . . . , L we have
P
(
Θl = θl
∣∣∣Ol = j,Φl = φl) = 1
8
where Φl, Θl, Ξl and Rl are defined as before. Also, O
l are the random variables corresponding to (arbitrary) POVMs
performed on individual systems. Then for any global POVM performed on the entire collection of L states we have
P
(
Θ = (θ1, ..., θL)
∣∣∣O = j,Φ = (φ1, ..., φL)) = 1
8L
where O is the random variable corresponding to the outcome of the global POVM.
Proof: Similar to the previous proof, from Bayes’ theorem, we have
P
(
Θ = (θ1, ..., θL)
∣∣∣O = j,Φ = (φ1, ..., φL))
=
P
(
O = j
∣∣∣Θ = (θ1, ..., θL),Φ = (φ1, ..., φL))P(Θ = (θ1, ..., θL),Φ = (φ1, ..., φL))
P
(
O = j,Φ = (φ1, ..., φL)
)
=
P
(
O = j
∣∣∣Θ = (θ1, ..., θL),Φ = (φ1, ..., φL))P(Θ = (θ1, ..., θL))P(Φ = (φ1, ..., φL))
P
(
O = j
∣∣∣Φ = (φ1, ..., φL))P(Φ = (φ1, ..., φL))
=
1
8L
Tr
[
Πj
⊗L
i=1
1
2
∑
ri
ρφi−θi−riπ
]
Tr
[
Πj
⊗L
i=1
1
8
1
2
∑
θi,ri
ρφi−θi−riπ
] .
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Let us define two local operators acting on lth state ρΞl by
Πlj ≡ Tr1,...,l−1,l+1,...,L
[
Πj
l−1⊗
i=1
1
2
(
∑
ri
ρφi−θi−riπ)
L⊗
i=l+1
1
2
(
∑
ri
ρφi−θi−riπ)
]
,
Π˜lj ≡ Tr1,...,l−1,l+1,...,L
[
Πj
l−1⊗
i=1
1
8
1
2
(
∑
θi,ri
ρφi−θi−riπ)
L⊗
i=l+1
1
8
1
2
(
∑
θi,ri
ρφi−θi−riπ)
]
.
The partial trace is a CPTP superoperator, hence the above operators are non-negative operators, and since
m∑
j=1
Πlj = I,
m∑
j=1
Π˜lj = I,
hence {Πlj}mj=1 and {Π˜lj}mj=1 are local POVMs on lth state.
Let Ol and O˜l be the random variables which correspond to the results of the POVMs {Πlj}mj=1 and {Π˜lj}mj=1,
respectively. Then, we have
P
(
Θ = (θ1, ..., θL)
∣∣∣O = j,Φ = (φ1, ..., φL)) = 1
8L
Trl
[
Πlj
1
2
∑
rl
ρφl−θl−rlπ
]
Trl
[
Π˜lj
1
8
1
2
∑
θl,rl
ρφl−θl−rlπ
]
=
1
8L
P (Ol = j|Φl = φl,Θl = θl)
P (O˜l = j|Φl = φl)
=
1
8L
P (Ol = j|Φl = φl,Θl = θl)
P (Ol = j|Φl = φl)
P (Ol = j|Φl = φl)
P (O˜l = j|Φl = φl)
=
1
8L−1
P (Ol = j|Φl = φl,Θl = θl)P (Φl = φl)P (Θl = θl)
P (Ol = j|Φl = φl)P (Φl = φl)
P (Ol = j|Φl = φl)
P (O˜l = j|Φl = φl)
=
1
8L−1
P (Ol = j|Φl = φl,Θl = θl)P (Φl = φl,Θl = θl)
P (Ol = j,Φl = φl)
P (Ol = j|Φl = φl)
P (O˜l = j|Φl = φl)
=
1
8L−1
P (Θl = θl|Φl = φl, Ol = j)P (O
l = j|Φl = φl)
P (O˜l = j|Φl = φl)
=
1
8L
P (Ol = j|Φl = φl)
P (O˜l = j|Φl = φl)
.
Note that P (Ol = j|Φl = φl) and P (O˜l = j|Φl = φl) are independent of θl, and hence
P
(
Θ = (θ1, ..., θL)
∣∣∣O = j,Φ = (φ1, ..., φL))
is also independent of θl. The same result holds for any l = 1, ..., L, hence the proof is completed. 
Recall that a single X/Z Dango chain is used for the implementation of a fixed X/Z rotation. The following lemma
shows this information does not help Bob to learn about Alice’s secret.
Lemma 3 Under the assumptions of Lemma 2, assume that Θ takes values with a non-zero probability only in a
subset K, i.e. Θ ∈ K ⊂ A×L. Then
P
(
Θ = θ
∣∣∣O = j,Φ = (φ1, ..., φL),Θ ∈ K) = 1|K|
for any θ ∈ K, (φ1, ..., φL) ∈ A×L, j ∈ {1, ...,m}, and POVM on
⊗L
i=1 ρΞi .
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Proof: Similar to the previous proofs, we have
P
(
Θ = θ
∣∣∣O = j,Φ = (φ1, ..., φL),Θ ∈ K) = P
(
Θ = θ,Θ ∈ K
∣∣∣O = j,Φ = (φ1, ..., φL))
P
(
Θ ∈ K
)
=
P
(
Θ = θ
∣∣∣O = j,Φ = (φ1, ..., φL))
P
(
Θ ∈ K
)
=
1/8L
|K|/8L .

Theorem 1 The single-server protocol satisfies (S1).
Proof: Bob receives 2NM Dango states, and therefore there are 2NM secret angles
{
ξ
Z/X
a,b
}(N,M)
(a,b)=(1,1)
. Bob also
receives 2NM angles
{
φ
Z/X
a,b
}(N,M)
(a,b)=(1,1)
from Alice. Let Θ,Φ ∈ A×2NM be random variables, and O ∈ {1, ...,m} be
the random variable which corresponds to the result of the POVM measurement which Bob performs on his system.
Since Bob knows that Alice tries the same rotation many times in a single Z/X-AKLT subsystem until she succeeds,
and that after the success of the rotation Alice implements the trivial identity operation on the rest of qutrits in
the Z/X-AKLT subsystem, Bob can assume that Θ takes values only in a subset K: Θ ∈ K ⊂ A×2NM , where
|K| = 82NM/n.
From Lemma 1, 2, and 3, we have the following equality ∀θ ∈ K, ∀φZ/Xa,b ∈ A, (a = 1, ..., N), (b = 1, ...,M),
j ∈ {1, ...,m}, and for any POVM
P
(
Θ = θ
∣∣∣O = j,Φ = {φZ/Xa,b }(N,M)(a,b)=(1,1),Θ ∈ K
)
=
1
|K|

Theorem 2 The single-server protocol satisfies (S2).
Proof: It is easy to see
• When RαZ(θZk,b, rZ(k−1)n+j,b) or RβZ(θZk,b, rZ(k−1)n+j,b) is implemented in the correlation space, the byproduct
XZr
Z
(k−1)n+j,b or XZr
Z
(k−1)n+j,b+1 occurs, respectively. If Bob has no information about the value of rZ(k−1)n+j,b,
he cannot know whether the byproduct Z appears or not.
• When RαX(θXk,b, rX(k−1)n+j,b) or RβX(θXk,b, rX(k−1)n+j,b) is implemented in the correlation space, the byproduct
Xr
X
(k−1)n+j,b+1Z or Xr
X
(k−1)n+j,bZ occurs, respectively. If Bob has no information about the value of rX(k−1)n+j,b,
he cannot know whether the byproduct X appears or not.
Note that we assume Alice’s computation is implemented via a regular structure hence it contains both X and Z
rotations. Therefore both byproducts of Pauli X and Z operators will appear leading to the full one-time padding
of the computation in the correlation space. In fact, we can show that Bob cannot have any information about the
values of {rZ/X(k−1)n+j,b} by showing similar proofs as those for {θ
Z/X
k,b }. However, it is easy to consider that θZ/Xk,b takes
values only 0 or π in the above proofs leading to the exchange of the role of {rZ/X(k−1)n+j,b} and {θ
Z/X
k,b }.
V. DOUBLE-SERVER PROTOCOL
In this section, we will explain the double-server protocol (Fig. 2). There are two advantages behind the new
protocol: Alice could be completely classical and more importantly the resource state preparation and computation
could be done more robustly using the energy-gap protection. To achieve these new features while keeping the security
requirement intact, it is assumed that the two servers, Bob1 and Bob2, share many Bell pairs but have no classical or
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quantum channel between them. As we will discuss later it is an interesting open question (both from the practical
and theoretical perspective) whether this assumption could be relaxed.
In the double-server protocol, Bob1 first creates AKLT resource states (without any random rotation), hence the
preparation and storage of the state could be performed using ground state energy-gap protection as described in
details in [14]. Next, depending on Alice’s desired gates, Bob1 adiabatically turns off the interaction between some
particles and the rest of particles in his resource state, and teleports these particles to Bob2 by consuming Bell pairs.
Bob1 sends Alice the result of the measurement in the teleportation through the classical channel. Note that due to
the lack of any communication (classical or quantum) channels between Bob1 and Bob2, the teleportation procedure
from Bobs’ point of view can be seen as a usage of a totally mixed channel where only Alice knows how to correct
the output of the channel.
Next, Alice calculates the angle in which particles should be measured by using her classical computer, and sends
Bob2 the angle which is the sum of the calculated angle plus the compensation for the byproduct and a random angle
to hide the actual angle of the computation. Bob2 performs the measurement in that angle and sends the result of
the measurement to Alice. Next, Alice sends the previous random angle to Bob1 and he does the single-qubit rotation
which compensates the added random angle. Bob1 and Bob2 repeat this two-way classical communication with Alice
until they finish the computation.
FIG. 5: (Color online.) (a): A chain |AKLTN,L,R〉. Each AKLT subsystem is specified with a blue circle. In this example,
n = 4. (b): Bob1 adiabatically turns off the interaction between a qutrit and others, and applies P † to the qutrit in order to
convert this qutrit into a pair of two qubits. (c): Bob1 teleports thus created two qubits to Bob2 by consuming two Bell pairs.
(d): Because of the teleportation, Pauli errors E and E′ occur.
We define a (k, b)th AKLT subsystem (k = 1, ..., N/n, b = 1, ...,M) to be the collection of n qutrits of the bth
AKLT chain with column index (k − 1)n + 1, (k − 1)n + 2, ..., (k − 1)n + n (Fig. 5 (a)). A single-qubit rotation is
implemented in a single AKLT subsystem. Let us assume that Alice wants to perform the single-qubit Z-rotation
exp
[
iZ
2 θ
Z
k,b
]
with θZk,b ∈ A using (k, b)th AKLT subsystem (Protocol 5). The protocol for implementing an arbitrary
X-rotation is similar and is given in the Appendix C. Finally, in order to perform blind CZ gates, similar to the
single-sever protocol, Bob1 periodically implements CZ gates. In order to keep the register state in the ground space,
the interactions are adiabatically turned off before each CZ gate. Unwanted CZ gates are canceled in the same way
as that in the single-server protocol.
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Protocol 5: Double-server Blind Z rotation
Initially the flag parameter (known to only Alice) is set τ = 1. Alice sets her secret parameter ǫZk,b = 0 and also chooses
random numbers δZk,b ∈ A. Alice sends Bob1 parameter values N , M and n < N . Bob1 creates M AKLT chains
|AKLTN,L,Rb 〉, where b = 1, ...,M (see Equation 1) of N qutrits arranged in an array of N columns and M rows. For
j = 1 · · ·n/2 Alice, Bob1, and Bob2 repeat (I)-(VI).
(I) Bob1 adiabatically turns off the interaction which acts on the jth qutrit of (k, b)th AKLT subsystem and applies P † to
the isolated qutrit in order to convert the qutrit into the pair of two qubits (Fig. 5 (b)). (The application of P † can be
done deterministically. For the physical implementation of P †, see Appendix A.)
(II) Bob1 teleports the created two qubits to Bob2 by consuming two Bell pairs (Fig. 5 (c)). These two teleported qubits are
affected by a two-qubit Pauli error E ⊗ E′ ∈ {I,X,Z,XZ} ⊗ {I,X,Z,XZ} (Fig. 5 (d)). Bob1 sends Alice the result of
the measurement in the teleportation and hence only Alice and Bob1 knows which error appears.
(III) Bob2 applies the filtering operation {I − |η1〉〈η1|, |η1〉〈η1|} to the received two qubits, and sends the result to Alice.
• If the Pauli error is I ⊗ I , X ⊗X, Z ⊗ Z, or XZ ⊗XZ, the probability of realizing |η1〉〈η1| is 0.
• If the Pauli error is I ⊗ Z, X ⊗XZ, Z ⊗ I , or XZ ⊗X, |η1〉〈η1| is realized with the probability 1/3. If |η1〉〈η1| is
realized, Z is implemented in the correlation space.
• If the Pauli error is I ⊗X, X ⊗ I , Z ⊗XZ, or XZ ⊗ Z, |η1〉〈η1| is realized with the probability 1/3. If |η1〉〈η1| is
realized, X is implemented in the correlation space.
• If the Pauli error is I ⊗XZ, X ⊗ Z, Z ⊗X, or XZ ⊗ I , |η1〉〈η1| is realized with the probability 1/3. If |η1〉〈η1| is
realized, XZ is implemented in the correlation space.
If |η1〉〈η1| is realized, skip steps (IV), (V) and (VI). If I − |η1〉〈η1| is realized, Bob2 further applies the PEPS operation
P on the two qubits. This PEPS operation is done deterministically, because the two qubits are already projected by
I − |η1〉〈η1|.
(IV) Alice sends the angle φZ(k−1)n+j,b to Bob2. This angle is determined according to the following rule:
• If the Pauli error is I ⊗ I , I ⊗ Z, Z ⊗ I , or Z ⊗ Z,
φZ(k−1)n+j,b = τθ
Z
k,b + τδ
Z
k,b + ξ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b + r
Z
(k−1)n+j,bπ (mod 2π),
where ξZ(k−1)n+j,b ∈ A and r
Z
(k−1)n+j,b ∈ {0, 1} are random numbers chosen by Alice, and signs of θ
Z
k,b and δ
Z
k,b
should be changed if there is the byproduct X before this step.
• If the Pauli error is X ⊗X, X ⊗XZ, XZ ⊗X, or XZ ⊗XZ,
φZ(k−1)n+j,b = −τθ
Z
k,b − τδ
Z
k,b − ξ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b + r
Z
(k−1)n+j,bπ (mod 2π),
where ξZ(k−1)n+j,b ∈ A and r
Z
(k−1)n+j,b ∈ {0, 1} are random numbers chosen by Alice, and signs of θ
Z
k,b and δ
Z
k,b
should be changed if there is the byproduct X before this step.
• If the Pauli error is I ⊗X, I ⊗XZ, X ⊗ I , X ⊗ Z, Z ⊗X, Z ⊗XZ, XZ ⊗ I , or XZ ⊗ Z,
φZ(k−1)n+j,b = ξ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b
where ξZ(k−1)n+j,b ∈ A is a random number chosen by Alice.
(V) Bob2 does the measurement M(φZ(k−1)n+j,b) (similar to Protocol 2), and sends the result to Alice. By this measurement,
following operations are implemented in the correlation space (see also Appendix B):
• If the Pauli error is I ⊗ I or Z ⊗ Z, |α(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉, |β(φ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)〉, or |γ〉 occurs with the probability 1/3
respectively. If |α(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is realized,
XZ
rZ(k−1)n+j,b exp
[ iZ
2
(
τθZk,b + τδ
Z
k,b + ξ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented. If |β(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is realized,
XZ
rZ(k−1)n+j,b+1 exp
[ iZ
2
(
τθZk,b + τδ
Z
k,b + ξ
Z
(k−1)+j,b
)]
is implemented. If |γ〉 is realized, Z is implemented.
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Protocol 5: — Continued
(V) —Continued
• If the Pauli error is I ⊗Z or Z⊗ I , |α(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 or |β(φ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)〉 occurs with the probability 1/2 respectively.
If |α(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is realized,
XZ
rZ(k−1)n+j,b+1 exp
[ iZ
2
(
τθZk,b + τδ
Z
k,b + ξ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented. If |β(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is realized,
XZ
rZ(k−1)n+j,b exp
[ iZ
2
(
τθZk,b + τδ
Z
k,b + ξ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented.
• If the Pauli error is X ⊗X or XZ ⊗XZ, |α(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉, |β(φ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)〉, or |γ〉 occurs with the probability 1/3
respectively. If |α(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is realized,
XZ
rZ(k−1)n+j,b exp
[ iZ
2
(
τθZk,b + τδ
Z
k,b + ξ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented. If |β(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is realized,
XZ
rZ(k−1)n+j,b+1 exp
[ iZ
2
(
τθZk,b + τδ
Z
k,b + ξ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented. If |γ〉 is realized, Z is implemented.
• If the Pauli error is X ⊗ XZ or XZ ⊗ X, |α(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 or |β(φ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)〉 occurs with the probability 1/2
respectively. If |α(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is realized,
XZ
rZ(k−1)n+j,b+1 exp
[ iZ
2
(
τθZk,b + τδ
Z
k,b + ξ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented. If |β(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is realized,
XZ
rZ(k−1)n+j,b exp
[ iZ
2
(
τθZk,b + τδ
Z
k,b + ξ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented.
• If the Pauli error is I ⊗X, X ⊗ I , Z ⊗ XZ, or XZ ⊗ Z, |α(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉, |β(φ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)〉, or |γ〉 occurs with the
probability 1
2
sin2[ 1
2
φZ(k−1)n+j,b],
1
2
cos2[ 1
2
φZ(k−1)n+j,b], or 1/2, respectively. If |α(φ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)〉 or |β(φ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is
realized, Z is implemented. If |γ〉 is realized, XZ is implemented.
• If the Pauli error is I ⊗XZ, X ⊗ Z, Z ⊗X, or XZ ⊗ I , |α(φZ(k−1)n+j,b)〉, |β(φ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)〉, or |γ〉 occurs with the
probability 1
2
cos2[ 1
2
φZ(k−1)n+j,b],
1
2
sin2[ 1
2
φZ(k−1)n+j,b], or 1/2, respectively. If |α(φ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)〉 or |β(φ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is
realized, Z is implemented. If |γ〉 is realized, X is implemented.
(VI) If the z-rotation exp[ iZ
2
(τθZk,b + τδ
Z
k,b + ξ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b)] is implemented in the previous step, Alice sets τ = 0, and ǫ
Z
k,b =
ǫZk,b+ ξ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b (mod 2π) (if there is no X byproduct before this rotation) or ǫ
Z
k,b = ǫ
Z
k,b− ξ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b (mod 2π) (if there
is the X byproduct before this rotation).
(VII) So far, the z-rotation
GZk,b exp
[ iZ
2
(ǫZk,b + δ
Z
k,b)
]
exp
[ iZ
2
θZk,b
]
up to some Pauli byproduct GZk,b is implemented. The probability that they fail to perform this z-rotation is (2/3)
n/2,
which is small for sufficiently large n. Alice asks Bob1 to correct the accumulated error. In order to do so she sends
Bob1 the angle ǫ˜Zk,b = ǫ
Z
k,b + δ
Z
k,b (mod 2π) if G
Z
k,b contains no X byproduct, and ǫ˜
Z
k,b = −ǫ
Z
k,b − δ
Z
k,b (mod 2π) if G
Z
k,b
contains the X byproduct. Bob1 implements the rotation exp
[
− iZ
2
ǫ˜Zk,b
]
by using the rest of the qutrits in (k, b)th AKLT
subsystem. The probability that Bob1 fails to perform this z-rotation is (1/3)n/2, which is small for sufficiently large n.
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VI. BLINDNESS OF THE DOUBLE-SERVER PROTOCOL
In this section, we will show the blindness of the double-server protocol.
Definition 2 A double-sever protocol is blind if
(D1) The conditional probability distribution of Alice’s nontrivial computational angles, given all the classical infor-
mation Bob1 can obtain during the protocol, and given the measurement results of any POVMs which Bob1 may
perform on his system at any stage of the protocol, is uniform,
(D2) The conditional probability distribution of Alice’s nontrivial computational angles, given all the classical infor-
mation Bob2 can obtain during the protocol, and given the measurement results of any POVMs which Bob2 may
perform on his system at any stage of the protocol, is uniform,
(D3) The register state in the correlation space is one-time padded to Bob1,
(D4) The register state in the correlation space is one-time padded to Bob2.
The proof is based on following lemmas.
Lemma 4 Bob1 cannot send any information to Bob2.
Proof: By the assumption, there is no channel between Bob1 and Bob2. Furthermore, Bob1 cannot send any
information to Bob2 via Alice either. This is due to the following facts. First, what Bob1 sends to Alice are the
“results of measurements in teleportations”. Second, what Alice sends to Bob2 are {φZ/X(k−1)n+j,b}. Third, recall that
Alice chooses the definition of each φ
Z/X
(k−1)n+j,b among
φ
Z/X
(k−1)n+j,b = τθ
Z/X
k,b + τδ
Z/X
k,b + ξ
Z/X
(k−1)n+j,b + r
Z/X
(k−1)n+j,bπ (mod 2π),
φ
Z/X
(k−1)n+j,b = −τθ
Z/X
k,b − τδZ/Xk,b − ξZ/X(k−1)n+j,b + r
Z/X
(k−1)n+j,bπ (mod 2π),
or
φ
Z/X
(k−1)n+j,b = ξ
Z/X
(k−1)n+j,b
according to what Bob1 sends to Alice. However, the value of each φ
Z/X
(k−1)n+j,b is independent of what Bob1 sends to
Alice, since ξ
Z/X
(k−1)n+j,b is completely random and therefore φ
Z/X
(k−1)n+j,b takes any value in A with equal probability,
whichever definition Alice chooses. Therefore,
P
(
T = t
∣∣∣Φ = {φZ/X(k−1)n+j,b}) = P
(
Φ = {φZ/X(k−1)n+j,b}
∣∣∣T = t)P(T = t)
P
(
Φ = {φZ/X(k−1)n+j,b}
)
= P
(
T = t
)
,
where T is the random variable which represents teleportation results.
Finally, Bell pairs shared between Bob1 and Bob2 cannot transmit any information from Bob1 to Bob2 without
sending a classical message from Bob1 to Bob2, since if it is possible, information is transfered faster than light from
Bob1 to Bob2. 
Lemma 5 Bob2 cannot send any information to Bob1.
Proof: Similar to the previous lemma, Bob2 cannot send any information to Bob1 via Alice. This is due to the
following facts. First, what Bob2 sends to Alice are the “results of filterings and measurements”. Second, what Alice
sends to Bob1 are {ǫ˜Z/Xk,b }. Third, although ǫZ/Xk,b depends on what Bob2 sends Alice, ǫ˜Z/Xk,b is independent of what
Bob2 sends Alice, since δ
Z/X
k,b is completely random. Therefore,
P
(
F = f
∣∣∣E = {ǫ˜Z/Xk,b }) = P
(
E = {ǫ˜Z/Xk,b }
∣∣∣F = f)P(F = f)
P
(
E = {ǫ˜Z/Xk,b }
)
= P
(
F = f
)
,
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where F is the random variable which represents the results of filterings and measurements. 
Theorem 3 The double-server protocol satisfies (D2).
Proof: From Lemma 4, Bob1 cannot send any information to Bob2. Therefore, all quantum states which Bob2
receives are completely mixed states, and all classical information which Bob2 gains are only {φZ/X(k−1)n+j,b}. Since
{ξZ/X(k−1)n+j,b} and {δ
Z/X
k,b } are completely random and independent from {θZ/Xk,b }, Bob2 cannot have any information
about {θZ/Xk,b } from {φZ/X(k−1)n+j,b}. 
Theorem 4 The double-server protocol satisfies (D4).
Proof: It is easy to see that
• When the z-rotation exp
[
iZ
2
(
θZk,b + δ
Z
k,b + ξ
Z
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented, the byproduct XZr
Z
(k−1)n+j,b or
XZr
Z
(k−1)n+j,b+1 occurs.
• When the x-rotation exp
[
−iX
2
(
θXk,b + δ
X
k,b + ξ
X
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented, the byproduct Xr
X
(k−1)n+j,bZ or
Xr
X
(k−1)n+j,b+1Z occurs.
Bob2 cannot gain any information about {rZ/X(k−1)n+j,b} from {φ
Z/X
(k−1)n+j,b}, since {ξ
Z/X
(k−1)n+j,b} and {δ
Z/X
k,b } are com-
pletely random and independent from {rZ/X(k−1)n+j,b}. 
Theorem 5 The double-server protocol satisfies (D3).
Proof: First, since {ξZ/X(k−1)n+j,b} are completely random, hence {ǫ
Z/X
k,b } is independent from {rZ/X(k−1)n+j,b}. Second,
although ǫ˜
Z/X
k,b is related to the parity of X or Z in G
Z/X
k,b , Bob1 cannot know these parities from {ǫ˜Z/Xk,b } since Bob1
does not know {δZ/Xk,b }. Therefore (D3) is satisfied. 
Theorem 6 The double-server protocol satisfies (D1).
Proof: From Lemma 5, Bob2 cannot send any information to Bob1. Therefore, the classical information which Bob1
can gain are only {ǫ˜Z/Xk,b }. Obviously, {ǫ˜Z/Xk,b } are independent from {θZ/Xk,b }. Furthermore, from Theorem 5, Bob1’s
states are one-time padded to him, therefore, no POVM on Bob1’s states gives information to Bob1. 
VII. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have investigated possibilities of blind quantum computing on AKLT states, which are physically-
motivated resource states for measurement-based quantum computation. We have shown that our blind quantum
computation protocols can enjoy several advantages of AKLT states, such as the cooling preparation of the resource
state, the energy-gap protection of the quantum computation, and the simple and efficient preparation of the resource
state in linear optics with biphotons.
We have presented two protocols, namely the single-sever protocol and the double-server protocol. In the single-
server protocol, we have shown that blind quantum computation is possible, if Alice is allowed to have weak quantum
technology as in the case of Ref. [3]. Because AKLT resources states exhibit many different properties from those of
the cluster state, several novel features have been introduced in our protocol compared with Ref. [3]. Furthermore,
new techniques and formalism have been required for the proof of the blindness of our protocol.
We have also seen that in our single-server protocol, quantum computation cannot be performed in the ground space
of a natural Hamiltonian, since if Bob does not know pre-rotated angles, he must prepare an unnatural Hamiltonian
with exponentially-degenerated ground states. This no-go theorem is general (we do not assume the state to be the
AKLT states), hence drastically new scheme of blind quantum computation must be required in order to perform
blind quantum computation in the ground space of a natural Hamiltonian in the single-server setting. On the other
hand, our double-server protocol is the first blind delegated quantum computing protocol in which Alice is completely
classical and quantum computation is performed in the ground space of a physically-motivated Hamiltonian.
One might think that why we have not considered the direct generalization of the double-server protocol in Ref. [3].
Here, the direct generalization means following protocol: Alice sends hidden angles {ξZa,b} to Bob1, and Bob1 creates
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rotated AKLT states. Bob1 then teleports his particles to Bob2, and Bob2 performs measurements. Let us briefly
explain why such a direct generalization does not work for AKLT resource states. If Bob1 teleports a prerotated
particle by ξZa,b, the operation implemented in the correlation space by Bob2’s measurement can be unwanted Z
rotation eiξ
Z
a,bZ/2 for certain teleportation error and Bob2’s measurement result. In this case, Alice must compensate
the accumulation of these unwanted rotations, and therefore she must send some number which is related to {ξZa,b}.
Since Bob1 knows teleportation errors and {ξZa,b}, he can gain some information about Bob2’s measurement results,
and therefore Bob2 can send some classical message to Bob1.
Although the assumption in the double-server protocol that two Bobs share no communication channel seems to
be somehow strong, it is not far from realistic. For example, let us consider an interesting future story where many
competing companies offer services of quantum computation (Fig. 6). A trusted third party (D) or the client (Alice)
herself distributes many Bell pairs among these companies, but the information of which company shares a particular
Bell pair with another particular company is kept secret to all companies. Alice then contacts two companies of her
choice and runs the double-server protocol by instructing both servers which Bell pair components they have to use.
Let us assume that Alice contacts Company1 and Company2, where neither of them know with which company is
doing the double-server protocol. Assume Company1 wants to cheat Alice, hence Company1 must call every other
companies. However, due to the competitive nature of the market, if Company1 contacts a wrong company, say
Company3, Company3 gains the evidence that Company1 is trying to cheat Alice, and Company3 can announce this
fact in order to destroy the credibility of Company1 thereby removing Company1 from the market. Probably investing
and maintaining a quantum server must be cost-expensive, hence no company wants to take the risk of being put out
of the business.
Alice
Company1
D
Company2
Company3
Company4
Company5
FIG. 6: (Color online.) D is the trusted third party which distributes Bell pairs. Two red circles connected by a red dotted
line are qubits of a single Bell pair.
At this stage, we do not know which quantum computation model (circuit, adiabatic, measurement-based model,
etc.) is the most promising candidate for the realization of a scalable quantum computer. Therefore, it is valuable
to explore possibilities of blind quantum computation in various models. It would be an interesting subject of future
study.
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Appendix A
The inverse P † of the PEPS P can be implemented as follows. Bob1 first prepares the two-qubit state |0〉 ⊗ |0〉,
and performs the filtering operation {Fi,j}(1,1)(i,j)=(0,0) on the qutrit to which he wants to apply P † and the two-qubit
state, where
Fi,j ≡ |1〉〈1| ⊗ |η3〉〈i, j|+ |2〉〈2| ⊗ |η4〉〈i, j|+ |3〉〈3| ⊗ |η2〉〈i, j|,
24
|i, j〉 ≡ |i〉 ⊗ |j〉, and
1∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
F †i,jFi,j = I.
With probability 1, F0,0 is realized. Next Bob1 measures the qutrit in the basis{ 1√
3
(
|1〉+ |2〉+ |3〉
)
,
1√
3
(
|1〉+ ei2π/3|2〉+ ei4π/3|3〉
)
,
1√
3
(
|1〉+ ei4π/3|2〉+ ei8π/3|3〉
)}
and corrects the phase error if the result is the second or the third one.
Appendix B
Let E ⊗ E′ ∈ {I,X, Z,XZ} ⊗ {I,X, Z,XZ} be the Pauli error on two qubits, and define the PEPS P˜ by
P˜ ≡ P (E ⊗ E′)P †P.
Also define the matrices {A˜[1], A˜[2], A˜[3]} by
P˜ =
1√
2
3∑
l=1
1∑
a=0
1∑
b=0
A˜a,b[l]|l〉〈a, b|,
where A˜a,b[l] depends on the Pauli error as summarized in the second, third, and fourth columns of the following
table. The fifth, sixth, and seventh columns are the summary of the operations implemented in the correlation space
by the measurementM(φ) after the PEPS P˜ for each error. The eighth, nineth, and tenth columns are the summary
of the operations implemented in the correlation space by the application of V and the measurement M(φ) after the
PEPS P˜ for each error.
E ⊗ E′ A˜[1] A˜[2] A˜[3] |α(φ)〉 |β(φ)〉 |γ〉 |α(φ)〉 |β(φ)〉 |γ〉
I ⊗ I X XZ Z XeiZφ/2 XZeiZφ/2 Z XZe−iXφ/2 Ze−iXφ/2 X
I ⊗X 0 −Z −XZ −Z −Z −XZ −Ze−iXφ/2 −XZe−iXφ/2 0
I ⊗ Z XZ X 0 XZeiZφ/2 XeiZφ/2 0 X X XZ
I ⊗XZ Z 0 −X Z Z −X −X −X Z
X ⊗ I 0 Z XZ Z Z XZ Ze−iXφ/2 XZe−iXφ/2 0
X ⊗X X −XZ −Z Xe−iZφ/2 −XZe−iZφ/2 −Z −XZe−iXφ/2 −Ze−iXφ/2 X
X ⊗ Z Z 0 X Z Z X X X Z
X ⊗XZ XZ −X 0 XZe−iZφ/2 −Xe−iZφ/2 0 −X −X XZ
Z ⊗ I −XZ −X 0 −XZeiZφ/2 −XeiZφ/2 0 −X −X −XZ
Z ⊗X Z 0 X Z Z X X X Z
Z ⊗ Z −X −XZ Z −XeiZφ/2 −XZeiZφ/2 Z −XZeiXφ/2 ZeiXφ/2 −X
Z ⊗XZ 0 −Z XZ −Z −Z XZ −ZeiXφ/2 XZeiXφ/2 0
XZ ⊗ I Z 0 −X Z Z −X −X −X Z
XZ ⊗X −XZ X 0 −XZe−iZφ/2 Xe−iZφ/2 0 X X −XZ
XZ ⊗ Z 0 Z −XZ Z Z −XZ ZeiXφ/2 −XZeiXφ/2 0
XZ ⊗XZ −X XZ −Z −Xe−iZφ/2 XZe−iZφ/2 −Z XZeiXφ/2 −ZeiXφ/2 −X
Appendix C
Protocol 6 describes how Alice performs the single-qubit x-rotation exp
[
−iX
2 θ
X
k,b
]
by θXk,b ∈ A in (k, b)th X-AKLT
subsystem.
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Protocol 6: Double-server Blind X rotation
Initially the flag parameter (known to only Alice) is set τ = 1. Alice sets her secret parameter ǫXk,b = 0 and also chooses
random numbers δXk,b ∈ A. Alice sends Bob1 parameter values N , M and n < N . Bob1 creates M AKLT chains
|AKLTN,L,Rb 〉, where b = 1, ...,M (see Equation 1) of N qutrits arranged in an array of N columns and M rows. For
j = 1, · · · , n/2, Alice, Bob1, and Bob2 repeat (I)-(VI), where the steps (I),(II)(III) are the same as in Protocol 5.
(IV) Alice sends the angle φX(k−1)n+j,b to Bob2. This angle is determined according to the following rule:
• If the Pauli error is I ⊗ I , I ⊗X, X ⊗ I , or X ⊗X,
φX(k−1)n+j,b = τθ
X
k,b + τδ
X
k,b + ξ
X
(k−1)n+j,b + r
X
(k−1)n+j,bπ (mod 2π),
where ξX(k−1)n+j,b ∈ A and r
X
(k−1)n+j,b ∈ {0, 1} are random numbers chosen by Alice, signs of θ
X
k,b and δ
X
k,b should
be changed if there is the byproduct Z before this step.
• If the Pauli error is Z ⊗ Z, Z ⊗XZ, XZ ⊗ Z, or XZ ⊗XZ,
φX(k−1)n+j,b = −τθ
X
k,b − τδ
X
k,b − ξ
X
(k−1)n+j,b + r
X
(k−1)n+j,bπ (mod 2π),
where ξX(k−1)n+j,b ∈ A and r
X
(k−1)n+j,b ∈ {0, 1} are random numbers chosen by Alice. Signs of θ
X
k,b and δ
X
k,b should
be changed if there is the byproduct Z before this step.
• If the Pauli error is I ⊗ Z, I ⊗XZ, X ⊗ Z, X ⊗XZ, Z ⊗ I , Z ⊗X, XZ ⊗ I , or XZ ⊗X,
φX(k−1)n+j,b = ξ
X
(k−1)n+j,b
where ξX(k−1)n+j,b ∈ A is a random number chosen by Alice.
(V) Bob2 applies V , does the measurement M(φX(k−1)n+j,b), and sends the result to Alice. By this measurement, following
operations are implemented in the correlation space (see also Appendix B):
• If the Pauli error is I ⊗ I or X ⊗ X, |α(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉, |β(φ
X
(k−1)n+j,b)〉, or |γ〉 occurs with the probability 1/3,
respectively. If |α(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is realized,
X
rX(k−1)n+j,b+1Z exp
[−iX
2
(
τθXk,b + τδ
X
k,b + ξ
X
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented. If |β(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is realized,
X
rX(k−1)n+j,bZ exp
[−iX
2
(
τθXk,b + τδ
X
k,b + ξ
X
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented. If |γ〉 is realized, X is implemented.
• If the Pauli error is I⊗X or X⊗I , |α(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉 or |β(φ
X
(k−1)n+j,b)〉 occurs with the probability 1/2, respectively.
If |α(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is realized,
X
rX(k−1)n+j,bZ exp
[−iX
2
(
τθXk,b + τδ
X
k,b + ξ
X
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented. If |β(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is realized,
X
rX(k−1)n+j,b+1Z exp
[−iX
2
(
τθXk,b + τδ
X
k,b + ξ
X
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented.
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Protocol 6: — Continued
(V) —Continued
• If the Pauli error is Z ⊗ Z or XZ ⊗XZ, |α(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉, |β(φ
X
(k−1)n+j,b)〉, or |γ〉 occurs with the probability 1/3,
respectively. If |α(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is realized,
X
rX(k−1)n+j,b+1Z exp
[−iX
2
(
τθXk,b + τδ
X
k,b + ξ
X
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented. If |β(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is realized,
X
rX(k−1)n+j,bZ exp
[−iX
2
(
τθXk,b + τδ
X
k,b + ξ
X
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented. If |γ〉 is realized, X is implemented.
• If the Pauli error is Z ⊗ XZ or XZ ⊗ Z, |α(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉 or |β(φ
X
(k−1)n+j,b)〉 occurs with the probability 1/2,
respectively. If |α(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is realized,
X
rX(k−1)n+j,bZ exp
[−iX
2
(
τθXk,b + τδ
X
k,b + ξ
X
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented. If |β(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is realized,
X
rX(k−1)n+j,b+1Z exp
[−iX
2
(
τθXk,b + τδ
X
k,b + ξ
X
(k−1)n+j,b
)]
is implemented.
• If the Pauli error is I ⊗ Z, X ⊗XZ, Z ⊗ I , or XZ ⊗X, |α(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉, |β(φ
X
(k−1)n+j,b)〉, or |γ〉 occurs with the
probability 1
2
cos2[ 1
2
φX(k−1)n+j,b],
1
2
sin2[ 1
2
φX(k−1)n+j,b], or 1/2, respectively. If |α(φ
X
(k−1)n+j,b)〉 or |β(φ
X
(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is
realized, X is implemented. If |γ〉 is realized, XZ is implemented.
• If the Pauli error is I ⊗XZ, X ⊗ Z, Z ⊗X, or XZ ⊗ I , |α(φX(k−1)n+j,b)〉, |β(φ
X
(k−1)n+j,b)〉, or |γ〉 occurs with the
probability 1
2
sin2[ 1
2
φX(k−1)n+j,b],
1
2
cos2[ 1
2
φX(k−1)n+j,b], or 1/2, respectively. If |α(φ
X
(k−1)n+j,b)〉 or |β(φ
X
(k−1)n+j,b)〉 is
realized, X is implemented. If |γ〉 is realized, Z is implemented.
(VI) If the x-rotation exp[−iX
2
(τθXk,b + τδ
X
k,b + ξ
X
(k−1)n+j,b)] is implemented in the previous step, Alice sets τ = 0, and ǫ
X
k,b =
ǫXk,b+ ξ
X
(k−1)n+j,b (mod 2π) (if there is no Z byproduct before this rotation) or ǫ
X
k,b = ǫ
X
k,b− ξ
X
(k−1)n+j,b (mod 2π) (if there
is the Z byproduct before this rotation).
(VII) So far, the x-rotation
GXk,b exp
[−iX
2
(ǫXk,b + δ
X
k,b)
]
exp
[−iX
2
θXk,b
]
up to a Pauli byproduct GXk,b is implemented. The probability that they fail to perform this rotation is (2/3)
n/2, which
is small for sufficiently large n. Alice asks Bob1 to correct the accumulated error. In order to do so she sends Bob1 the
angle ǫ˜Xk,b = ǫ
X
k,b + δ
X
k,b (mod 2π) if G
X
k,b contains no Z byproduct, and ǫ˜
X
k,b = −ǫ
X
k,b − δ
X
k,b (mod 2π) if G
Z
k,b contains the
Z byproduct. Bob1 implements the rotation exp
[
iX
2
ǫ˜Xk,b
]
by using the rest of the qutrits in (k, b)th AKLT subsystem.
The probability that Bob1 fails to perform this x-rotation is (1/3)n/2, which is small for sufficiently large n.
